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ABSTRACT The purpose of this article is to analyse Hobbes’s 
understanding of democracy. The first part of the article analyses the 
role of democracy in the social contract. It aims to show how there exists 
a democratic element at the beginning of the process of social contract, 
in which the multitude is transformed into a people. However, after 
the first social contract is made, Hobbes aims to reduce the power of 
the people by leading the process of social contract on to another level, 
on which the power of the people is assigned to a representative of the 
sovereign power, for example a monarch. The second part of the article 
aims to explain the practical reasons, provided by Hobbes in different 
parts of his political theory, for his aversion to a democratic form of 
government. Main reason for this, it is argued, is that democratic 
government is closest to the unwanted multitude. Thus, in his political 
theory Hobbes uses democracy to build sovereign power, but does not 
trust it as a form of government.
KEY WORDS Thomas Hobbes; democracy; social contract; populism; 
multitude.
RESUMEN El propósito de este artículo es analizar la comprensión de 
Hobbes de la democracia. La primera parte del artículo analiza el papel 
de la democracia en el contrato social. Su objetivo es mostrar cómo existe 
un elemento democrático al comienzo del proceso de contrato social, en 
el que la multitud se transforma en pueblo. Sin embargo, después de que 
se realiza el primer contrato social, Hobbes pretende reducir el poder 
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el poder del pueblo se asigna a un representante del poder soberano, por 
ejemplo un monarca. La segunda parte del artículo pretende explicar las 
razones prácticas, proporcionadas por Hobbes en diferentes partes de su 
teoría política, para su aversión a una forma democrática de gobierno. La 
principal razón de esto, se argumenta, es que el gobierno democrático es 
el más cercano a la indeseada multitud. Así, en su teoría política, Hobbes 
utiliza la democracia para construir el poder soberano, pero no confía en él 
como forma de gobierno.
PALABRAS CLAVE Thomas Hobbes; democracia; contrato social; 
populismo; multitud.
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Thomas Hobbes’s scepticism towards democracy is widely known. In 
The Elements of Law, Natural and Politic he wrote that “a democracy, 
in effect, is nothing more than an aristocracy of orators, interrupted 
sometimes with the temporary monarchy of one orator” (Hobbes, 
1640/2005c, 21.5, p. 141). Despite his rather clear formulations against 
the popular and democratic form of government, Hobbes’s theory and 
relation to democracy has been under a lot of debate in the past two 
or three decades (Apperley, 1997; Curran, 2007; Dyzenhaus, 2001; 
Hoekstra, 2007; Martinich, 2007; Matheron, 1997; Mastnak, 2009; 
Pettit, 2008). Generally, Hobbes is considered to be a monarchist who 
opposed democracy both theoretically and politically (Dyzenhaus, 
2001, p. 428; Hoekstra, 2007; Martinich, 2007, p. 158-159). However, 
some scholars have recently claimed that Hobbes can and should be 
seen as a radical democrat or a republican writer (Martel, 2007; Pettit, 
2008, p. 121-122; Rahe, 2008; Tuck, 2007).
However, while both these lines of interpretation are tempting 
and interesting in many ways, it is much more accurate to state that 
Hobbes had a rather paradoxical relationship to democracy. Despite his 
negative feelings against democracy as a mode of government, Hobbes 
in fact constructed one of the most prominent theories of democracy 
in the early modern period, which had a significant theoretical impact 
on the development of the democratic theory in modern times (Jaume, 
1986; Lemos, 1978, p. 69; Matheron, 1997). It is also crucial to point 
out how Hobbes designed his theory of state to apply to three different 
regimes: monarchy, aristocracy and democracy. Thus, even though 
he saw monarchy as the best form of government, he thought that 
aristocracy and democracy are legitimate forms of a government as well 
(Hobbes, 1642/2003, Preface to the readers). 
This article follows Creppell’s idea that Hobbes’s notion of the 
social contract, as well as his theory of sovereignty, were connected to 
and commented on the new rising form of politics, that is, democracy:
His writings are a response to a new social condition – a 
democratizing world and the demands from mobilized 
populations. Behemoth is an extended description of and reaction 
to that dynamism, both positive and negative, of new conditions 





The article takes as a starting point the argument that Hobbes’s 
theory of social contract includes several elements which are typical for 
democracy. In the process of social contract, the anarchic and chaotic 
multitude is transformed into a political subject, the people. The people 
represents the first form of political unity and is the basis of sovereignty. 
However, not all the elements of the social contract are democratic in 
their nature. In further development of the social contract, Hobbes’s 
ultimate aim was to get rid of the people as representative of sovereign 
power and instead offer monarchy as the best form of government, that 
is, as the best available political representation of abstract sovereign 
power. Thus, it simply argues that even though Hobbes needed 
democracy as part of his political theory, he did not ever want to see 
democratic governance in action.
The second purpose of this article is to show why and how 
Hobbes disregarded democracy as a mode of government. The main 
argument is that the reasons for his strong dislike towards democratic 
government are connected to two intertwined questions: The problems 
of the multitude and populism. Hobbes saw that the democratic mode 
of government strengthens populist leaders who rhetorically mislead 
both common and educated people to the point where demagogy turns 
into chaos and the logic of the multitude gets to reign. When the anarchic 
and chaotic forces of multitude have been unleashed, it is difficult, even 
if not impossible, to regain any control over the commonwealth. This 
leads to the destruction of sovereign power, the very thing that secures 
order in the society. In short, this article aims to show that Hobbes was 
sceptical towards democracy because he thought that democracy has 
too close a relationship with the reign of the multitude.
The article proceeds in the following way. In the first chapter, I 
introduce the problem and the question of the multitude in relation to 
the social contract. First, I analyse what kind of a problem the question 
of the multitude was for Hobbes and what kind of relationship it 
has to the question of power. Second, I explain how the multitude is 
transformed into a sovereign power in the process of social contract. 
Finally, I elaborate a little more on Hobbes’s theory of representation 
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of the multitude. Thus, the first section is a theoretical presentation of 
the way Hobbes constructs political power.
In the second chapter, I address the more practical problems 
Hobbes identifies with democratic government and governance. Thus, 
this section explains why Hobbes avoided and disregarded in every 
possible way the democratic governance, even though it is rather clear 
that in his theory the formation of the state is based on a democratic 
process. I first take a look on how Hobbes sees democracy as a flat way 
of governing the commonwealth, which is indeed too tightly posed over 
the reign of the multitude. Secondly, I show how Hobbes was wary of 
the rule of the populist leaders and their rhetoric inside the democratic 
concert. Following this, I then show how democratic government leads, 
according to Hobbes, to corruption and the rule of passions. The fourth 
and last part consists of an analysis of how the basic process of political 
governance, that is the process of deliberation, is almost impossible in 
the democracy described by Hobbes. I finish with some conclusions 
concerning Hobbes’s relationship towards democracy and the dangers 
he saw in democratic government.
The Theory of the Multitude and Social Contract
The Problem of the Multitude and Power
The concept of the multitude has a long history in political thought 
before Hobbes. In the classical period, Plato, Aristotle and Thucydides, 
for instance, used concepts such as plethos, oi polloi and ochlos. All of 
these refer to a common people, mob or plebs. Later in the Roman 
political thought, multitudo was a concept with somewhat similar 
content: Plebs, common people and underclass were typical synonyms 
for multitudo. In the Renaissance, Machiavelli most prominently used 
the term: For him moltitudine was not just a group of common people. 
Instead he uses the concept to refer to violent mobs and confused 
crowds, both attributes that had already been used by Plato and 
Aristotle (See Jakonen, 2013, pp. 48-55).
Hobbes often criticized Aristotle, but he agreed with his analysis 
on the dangerous aspects of democracy, as it risks turning into mob 





legitimate forms of democracy (trans. 1995, 1295b35-1296a10). The 
fifth form of democracy is demos eschatos (δημος εσχατος), which in 
fact refers to the people in its extreme form, the multitude (plethos). For 
Aristotle demos eschatos is the “most headstrong sort of democracy”, 
but the concept itself does not refer to democracy as a legitimate 
form of government.1 In the rule of plethos or the demos eschatos, the 
rule of law collapses and the polis enters into a chaotic state where the 
multitude rules without any political structure, norm or tradition, 
that is, without authority. Demos eschatos means that the rule of the 
common people (demos) has gone too far: Demos eschatos is the rule of 
the multitude beyond law and constitution. Hobbes followed Aristotle 
in this question as he strongly condemns the rule of the multitude as an 
illegitimate or apolitical mode of power.
In medieval times, the Latin term multitudo also had the meaning 
of population (Biller, 2000). In Hobbes’s own time, the word multitude 
was widely used to refer to a poor, confused, rebellious and sometimes 
violent crowd consisting of common people. It was a commonplace word 
in the biblical, religious and political language, with a loosely defined 
meaning.2 However, although Hobbes was familiar with both the 
classical meaning and the coeval usage of the word, he also elaborated 
and redefined the concept for the purposes of his own political theory 
—as he did with most of the political concepts he used. In what follows, 
I describe the way Hobbes saw the multitude, which differs drastically 
from the way classical and essentialist political thought understood it.
In Hobbes’s use, the multitude does not only refer to the 
common people and plebs as is the case with the classics, but instead 
to every person or group of people living without sovereign power or 
against its orders. Furthermore, it is also important to clarify that 
in Hobbes’s use, the multitude does not point to a certain group of 
people with certain history, quality, ethnicity or background. Instead, 
1  Richard Tuck interprets Aristotle’s stand point differently, which leads him also to interpret 
Hobbes’s theory of the origins of the sovereign power differently. See Tuck (2007) and for a 
critique of Tuck’s interpretation Jakonen 2013, pp. 105-110.
2  An idea of the uses of the multitude in Hobbes’s time might be grasped from Christopher 
Hill’s book The World Turned Upside Down: Radical Ideas During the English Revolution (Hill, 
1975). See also Evans (2000), who tells about the poor (multitude) in early modern Exeter, and 
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anyone, whether rich or poor, good or evil, young or old, may belong 
to the multitude, or to be even more precise, these categories do 
not play any role in the meaning of the multitude. For Hobbes, 
the multitude is a name for a disorganized, confused, headless, 
anarchical and powerless collection of human beings, one without 
any specific form, shape or essence. The multitude is human matter 
that is always in motion: The multitude changes and goes through 
constant metamorphoses. Yet, on the other hand, the multitude is 
an absolutely stagnant and powerless mass of human beings: It is 
more potentiality than actuality. It is difficult to understand the 
multitude’s undertakings; there is no other common denominator for 
their actions than that they are the actions of the multitude, since the 
multitude does not represent anything. The multitude is a monster, 
half a man, half an animal. It is a mythical, Biblical violent beast, the 
Behemoth, which Hobbes describes in his History of English Civil Wars. 
The multitude is something that opposes the king of pride, Leviathan, 
the principle of political order (Jakonen, 2013, pp. 56-72).3
Thus, the multitude is, in fact, the logic that defines the motion 
and confusion of human crowds, instead of being an ostensive term. 
The logic of the multitude is an outcome of the necessity of egoism, 
which derives from the fact that people do not feel safe in the anarchic 
state of nature, where the rule of law does not exist. In Hobbes’s 
philosophy, the multitude is matter in motion and as such a political 
problem that calls for a definitive, geometric answer. Still, the problem 
of the multitude is fundamentally unsolvable, since even after the 
social contract the logic of the multitude haunts the organized political 
community, as will be shown in this article. For Hobbes, the question 
of the multitude is something that political government and political 
theory must constantly think about and in his philosophy, he offers 
elementary tools for this (Jakonen, 2013, pp. 56-72).
Now, in addition to the above description, Hobbes’s theory of 
the multitude is also a theory of individuation. Facing and sensing 
the chaotic and violent body of the multitude in the state of nature, 
people come to understand that they are first of all individuals. 
3  Concerning the mythical etymology of the Behemoth and Leviathan, see Tralau (2007, pp. 





Participating in religious sects, political parties or rebellious groups 
means that the individuals put their own life in danger. Even loyalty 
to one’s family might be dangerous. The most important thing for 
human beings is to safeguard their own lives: Self-preservation is the 
highest moral law. Thus, with his theory of multitude Hobbes calls for 
people to understand that the biggest threat to their safety and well-
being is the unlimited action and motion (absolute liberty) of each 
and every one. Yet, disengaging from this threat is not possible by 
attacking others, since in the multitude people are equal. Instead, the 
answer is to lay down arms and subject oneself to the arbitrary power 
of others. Hobbes believes that all the people will find the same fear 
of violent death inside themselves. By self-examination, through 
recognizing the fundamental nature of the fear of violent death, 
people prepare themselves for making an individual decision about 
forming a sovereign power that transcends all the possible political, 
religious or militant groups, i.e., the logic of the multitude (Jakonen, 
2013, pp. 56-72, 73-98).
Now, it seems that the distance of the multitude, be it an ensemble 
of different, heterogeneous groups or lonely individuals, from the 
sovereign power is vast. Hobbes however states that originally, that is 
prior to the fictive social contract there was/is nothing else than this 
moving matter of displaced and disorganized human beings. Therefore, 
it is worthwhile to ask how it is possible to create a sovereign power out 
of the multitude and to bridge this fundamental gap. And why cannot 
the multitude be a political subject?
The main reason why the multitude cannot ever be a political 
subject,4 a political entity or a commonwealth is that the multitude 
does not have one will, but instead a plurality of wills. Every individual 
has her own mind, her own will and own endeavour, since the logic of 
the multitude prevails in every individual. In the multitude, there is no 
common understanding about anything. The multitude cannot act as 
one person and it cannot make collective decisions. The multitude is 
a direct expression of the actions of the individuals, as Hobbes states 
in De Cive: “Whatever is done by the multitude must be understood 
4  This was different with the classics, who saw that the multitude, which they see as common 
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as being done by each of those who make up that crowd [multitudo]” 
(1642/2003, 6.1, p. 76 [218]).5
It is obvious that in the multitude, there is no representation of 
men, no mediation between the actions of men and the authorization 
of those actions. The multitude is a direct expression of individual 
desires and actions. Since the multitude cannot act in the name of the 
commonwealth, it is impossible to attach any legal action to it: The civil 
law does not concern the multitude. This is because the multitude is 
not a natural or an artificial person, but a plurality of natural persons 
that has yet to be institutionalised as an artificial person. 
Finally, the fundamental meaning and the problem of the 
multitude for Hobbes’s political theory becomes clearer if it is analysed 
from the viewpoint of political power. In the Leviathan Hobbes writes 
about the social contract in the following way:
This done, the multitude so united in one person is called a 
COMMONWEALTH; in Latin, CIVITAS. This is the generation of 
that great LEVIATHAN, or rather, to speak more reverently, of that 
mortal god to which we owe, under the immortal God, our peace 
and defence. For by this authority, given him by every particular 
man in the Commonwealth, he hath the use of so much power and 
strength conferred on him that, by terror thereof, he is enabled to 
form the wills of them all, to peace at home, and mutual aid against 
their enemies abroad. (1651/1999, 17.13, p. 114).
This unanimity, the artificial construction of one mind and one 
will in the social contract is necessary:
For being distracted in opinions concerning the best use and 
application of their strength, they do not help, but hinder one 
another; and reduce their strength by mutual opposition to 
nothing. (Hobbes, 1651/1999, 17.4, p. 112).
In other words, the question of the multitude in Hobbes’s 
political theory is a question of the absence and formation of political 
power. The question between the multitude and the social contract is 
a case between absolute power (sovereignty) and the total absence of 
5  Silverthorne and Tuck (2003) translate the word multitudo systematically as crowd. I 





power (the multitude). Hobbes sees that without a contract under which 
people join together and form a sovereign power, there is no possibility 
to live politically and in an industrious way. Without a contract that 
binds human beings together, there is no common power and no state. 
Without common power, there is no possibility to do things that are 
beyond the strength of a single individual or the multitude, such as 
lift heavy stones or build large buildings —or generally, live a good life 
(Hobbes, 1651/1999, 17.9, p. 84).
Hence, Hobbes sees that the multitude is absolutely incapable of 
bringing peace and security to the state of nature. It does not have the 
power to calm down the violence between individual men or groups of 
men (sects, parties etc.), since in the multitude there is no (qualitative) 
majority, only an ensemble of minorities (Hobbes, 1651/1999, 17.3, p. 
112). It is for this reason that the bellum omnium contra omnes is such 
a crucial formulation in Hobbes’ theory. He simply tries to form a 
theory of power that can secure peace in a large area and population by 
explaining how the principal enemy of all political order, the logic of 
the multitude which escalates into the war of every man against every 
man, can be overcome.
Theory of Social Contract and Representation
The question of democracy in Hobbes’s political thought is primarily 
a question of social contract, the constitution of the state. However, 
since the social contract is a series of motions and transformations, 
one has to be careful to recognize correctly all the different forms 
political power takes. With social contract, first of all, the multitude 
transforms into a people, many (omnes) turn to one (singuli), a lonely 
and independent individual turns into a citizen and a subject. On 
the second phase of the social contract, the people is divided in two: 
the monarch and the population, the latter of which Hobbes calls a 
multitude. This is, however, a different sort of multitude than the one 
living in the state of nature, and the monarch is a different sort of the 
people than the people in the first phase of the social contract.6 In what 
follows, I will analyse these different transformations.
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For Hobbes, the change from the reign of the multitude to the 
commonwealth is a question of the right kind of contract between every 
man with every man (1651/1999, 17.13, p. 114). The sovereign power 
is the outcome of a metamorphosis7 in which the plurality of wills are 
condensed into a single one. It is this body that is authorized by every 
man who participated in the constitution of sovereign power, that is, by 
those who belonged to the multitude and participated in the act of voting: 
A commonwealth is said to be instituted, when a multitude of men 
do agree, and covenant, every one, with every one, that to whatsoever 
man, or assembly of men, shall be given the major part, the 
right to present the person of them all (that is to say, to be their 
representative) every one, as well he that voted for it, as he that voted 
against it, shall authorize all the actions and judgements, of that 
man, or assembly of men, in the same manner, as if they were his 
own, to the end, to live peaceably amongst themselves, and be 
protected against other men. (Hobbes, 1651/1999, 18.1, p. 115).
It seems that the basic idea of democracy as the rule of an elected 
majority is in at the heart of the Hobbesian idea of social contract and 
sovereignty. Thus, for Hobbes the sovereign power is originally a sort 
of democratic majority. In The Elements of Law Hobbes writes:
The first in order of time of these three sorts is democracy, 
and it must be so of necessity, because an aristocracy and a 
monarchy, require nomination of persons agreed upon; which 
agreement in a great multitude of men must consist in the 
consent of the major part; and where the votes of the major 
part involve the votes of the rest, there is actually a democracy. 
(1640/2005c, 2.1, pp. 138-139).
7  It is noteworthy that in Hobbes’s early political writings (Horae Subsecivae: A Discourse Upon 
the Beginning of Tacitus), he did not have the idea of a social contract. Instead, the beginning of 
the commonwealth is seen as accidental and the term multitude is used to mean what is later 
called democracy: “The first form of government in any State is accidental: that is, according 
to the condition the Founder happens to be of. If one man of absolute power above rest, be 
the Founder of a City, he will likewise be the Ruler of the same; if a few, then a few will have 
the government; and if the multitude, then commonly will do the like” (1620/1995, pp. 31-






In The Elements of Law, democracy, as a rule established by the 
majority of votes, is chronologically the first instance of sovereign 
power. Yet, the crucial problem of democracy seems to be the lack 
of contract between the sovereign power and its subjects. This is 
because when “democracy is a making, there is no sovereign with 
whom to contract” (Hobbes, 1640/2005c, 2.2, p. 139). In De Cive, 
Hobbes states that “democracy is not constituted by agreements 
which individuals make with the People, but by mutual agreements 
of individuals with other individuals” (1642/2003, 7.7, p. 95 [240]). 
This is in a way the purest form of social contract and it means that the 
birth of sovereign power is at the same time the birth of the people: 
“Prior to the formation of a commonwealth a People [populus] does 
not exist, since it was not then a person but a multitude of individual 
persons” (1642/2003, 7.7, p. 95 [240]).
Now, it is important to note that on a theoretical level, sovereignty 
(sovereign power) is something fundamentally different from the 
sovereign, the representative of sovereign power. In De Cive, Hobbes, 
writing about the differences between the kinds of sovereign power, 
states very clearly that “the differences between commonwealths are 
derived from the difference in the persons to whom sovereign power 
is committed” (Hobbes, 1642/2003, 7.1, p. 91 [235]).8 A little later he 
clarifies the difference between the Aristotelian concepts of potentia 
and actus by applying them to politics:
For government [imperium] is a capacity [potential], administration 
of government is an act [actus]. Power is equal in every kind of 
commonwealth; what differs are the acts, i.e. the motions and 
actions of the commonwealth, depending on whether they originate 
from the deliberations of many or of a few, of the competent or of 
the incompetent. (Hobbes, 1642/2003, 10.16, p. 125 [276]).9
8  A little earlier Hobbes states that in democracy, “sovereign power lies with an Assembly in 
which any citizen has the right to vote; it is called DEMOCRACY” (1642/2003, 7.1, pp. 91-92 
[236]). The difference between sovereign power and the ones that use that sovereign power is 
very clear. 
9  Translators of De Cive here translate imperium as government. In my text, I use the term 
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Hence, there are in fact two phases in the process of political 
representation. First of all, sovereign power represents the power 
of individuals, which amounts to nothing in the multitude as the 
individuals are hindered by each other. Thus, sovereign power is 
ultimately the power of the people, not of the multitude. Sovereignty 
is the actual omnipotence of the people over the multitude, or in other 
words, the omnipotence of the political subject over the apolitical mass 
of individuals. Secondly, a government, be it monarchy, aristocracy 
or democracy, represents this sovereign power as the sovereign. The 
sovereign is the one who uses the abstract and artificial sovereign 
power and orders the ways the commonwealth acts and moves. In 
other words, the administration of government in the commonwealth 
means controlling the motions of people. Sovereignty is, however, the 
artificial soul and the prime mover of the commonwealth (Hobbes, 
1651/1999, intro., p. 7).10
Furthermore sovereignty (sovereign power) and the sovereign (the 
representative of sovereign power) should never be actually separated. 
Sovereign power always completely rests upon a natural person who 
bears sovereignty: “Whosoever beareth the person of the people, or is 
one of that assembly that bears it, beareth also his own natural person” 
(Hobbes, 1651/1999, 19.4, p. 124). Otherwise, sovereignty is divided 
(mixed government), which is not in Hobbes’s interests.
The negative examples given by Hobbes concerning elective 
kings and other limited sovereigns tells that sovereign power and the 
bearer of sovereign power should always be completely united in one 
natural person. Although the person of the state is artificial, the best 
outcomes in government are reached if the person looks and acts like 
a natural person. This means that in a monarchy, the sovereign power 
of the people must be completely transferred to a monarch. The ability 
of sovereign people to limit the power of the monarch would render 
the monarch a minister of sovereign power, not the sovereign itself 
(Hobbes, 1651/1999, 19.10-14, pp. 127-129).
10  Yet, one must not forget that the real origin of the motion in the commonwealth 
is the appetite of each individual combined to a multitude in motion, which 






Thus, as was stated above, there is in fact another contract in 
which an aristocracy or a monarchy is created through democracy. 
With this contract, the people transfers its rights and sovereignty. 
In the transfer of rights, the people as a person ceases to exist but it 
does not, however, return into a formless and anarchic multitude. 
All obligations towards the public person of the people cease as they 
become a population instead of a political subject and new obligations 
towards a new representative of the sovereign power (the political 
subject), for example a monarch, are created. But it is important to 
note that originally the sovereign monarch received the power from 
the sovereign people who voted for its transfer. In this way, it is 
impossible for the citizens to act legally against the will of the sovereign 
monarch, since the citizens have voluntarily transferred their rights to 
the monarch (Hobbes, 1642/2003, 7.10-12, p. 96 [241-242]).
Since the people is the first instance of government after the social 
contract, or in fact, the social contract is basically a democratic meeting11, 
it is necessary to understand why exactly Hobbes wants to get rid of the 
democratic government and why he prefers monarchy as the best form 
of government. If democracy is needed to establish sovereign power, 
why is it so important to give away of it as soon as the state is properly 
formed? In what follows, I suggest the reason for this is that the people 
as a sovereign, that is, as the representative of sovereignty, is a form of 
government that is too close to the unwanted multitude.
The Problems of Democratic Government
Flat Government
The first and perhaps the most important thing to note regarding 
Hobbes’s aversion to democratic government is that the 
representative of sovereign power and its subjects are superposed 
in a way that makes it difficult to actually separate them from each 
other. In this sense, the power relation between those who govern 
and those who are governed, compared to aristocracy and monarchy, 
is in democracy flat. In fact, the problem of the divided nature of the 
11  “When men have met to erect a commonwealth, they are, almost by the very fact that they 




Needed but Unwanted. Thomas Hobbes’s Warnings on the 
Dangers of Multitude, Populism and Democracy 
political subject is the most palpable in democracy. In Hobbes’ own 
words, “the nature of commonwealth is that a multitude of citizens12 
both exercises power and is subject to power, but in different senses” 
(Hobbes, 1642/2003, 6.1, p. 76 [217]). Hence, Hobbes seems to 
suggest that a democratic government is not the best example of the 
possibilities of the geometry of power.
This makes things very complicated in a democracy: The same 
people are rulers and governed subjects. Every individual is divided in 
two since they must see themselves as both the authors of sovereign 
action and the subjects of government. Several problems follow from 
this dichotomy. In The Elements of Law Hobbes states:
How unjust soever the action be, that this sovereign demus shall do, 
is done by the will of every particular man subject to him, who are 
therefore guilty of same. If therefore they style it injury, they but 
accuse themselves. And it is against reason for the same man, both 
to do and complain; implying this contradiction, that whereas he 
first ratified the people’s acts in general, he now disalloweth some 
of them in particular. (1640/2005c, 2.3, p. 140).
Hobbes sees that it is difficult, or even impossible to expect that 
people could be able to see themselves operating in two roles. Quite the 
contrary, they constantly mix up their two roles as political subjects and 
the objects of political governance. A lengthier citation from De Cive 
explains the way Hobbes sees the relationship between the political 
subject (people) and the governed object (the multitude):
Men do not make a clear enough distinction between a people 
and multitude. A people is a single entity, with a single will; you can 
attribute an act to it. None of this can be said of a multitude. In 
every commonwealth the People Reigns: for even in Monarchies 
the People exercises power [imperat]; for the people wills through 
the will of one man. But the citizens, i.e. the subjects, are a 
multitude. In a Democracy and in an Aristocracy the citizens are 
the multitude, but the council is the people; in a Monarchy the 
subjects are the multitude, and (paradoxically) the King is the 
12  The term multitudo is used here simply to refer to the large number of citizens, not to the 





people. Ordinary people and others who do not notice this point, 
always speak of a large number of men as the people, i.e. as the 
commonwealth; they speak of the commonwealth having rebelled 
against the king (which is impossible) and of the people wanting, 
or not wanting, what malcontent and murmuring subjects want 
or do not want; under this label of the people, they are setting 
the citizens against the commonwealth, i.e. the Multitude against 
the people. (Hobbes, 1642/2003, 12.8, p. 137 [291-292], see also 
1640/2005c, 2.11, pp. 145-146).
Thus, according to Hobbes, the multitude does not in fact vanish 
in the social contract. Instead, when the political subject is born, the 
multitude becomes an object of governance, or, in a modern parlance, 
a population. Accordingly, if the people as the sovereign acts upon a 
subject, in this case an individual ultimately at war with the sovereign,13 
the subject has the right to reciprocate, since every member of a 
democratic state is also a part of sovereign government. Every subject 
in democracy is directly responsible for every action of the sovereign, 
the people (Hobbes, 1640/2005c, 2.3, p. 140).
In democracy, the democratic government and the multitude (the 
political subject and the object of governance) are superposed, since 
the same people are the material of both. This means that the power 
of the people is not actually gathered into one Archimedean point, but 
is instead dispersed to cover every particular man. Thus, democracy 
is a rather abstract form of government, since the artificiality of 
the public person is so obvious. The system of authorisation and 
representation does not work properly in democracy: One is not able 
to distinguish between the source of sovereign power (people) and the 
user of sovereign power (people). Even more importantly, one is not 
able to distinguish between the ones governing (people) and the ones 
governed (the multitude, population).
13  According to Hobbes, a citizen is always in the relation of state of nature to sovereign power. 
Sovereign power has a power to kill its subject, if needed (Hobbes, 1651/1999, 21.7, pp. 141-
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Populist Leaders
Hobbes sees the democratic meeting as a sort of an open gathering 
in which people are allowed to participate rather freely. A depiction 
of this can be found in The Elements of Law. Here the most important 
part of Hobbes’s argument seems to be that a state tied to a democratic 
process of constant deliberation and rhetoric, which are most typical 
for democratic meetings, cannot operate properly. In a democratic 
meeting, all negative elements related to demagogy and eloquence, and 
thus to the multitude, are actualized:
In all democracies, though the right of sovereignty be in the 
assembly, which is virtually the whole body; yet the use thereof 
is always in one, or a few particular men. For in such great 
assemblies as those must be, where into every man may enter at 
his pleasure, there is no means any ways to deliberate and give 
counsel what to do, but by long and set orations; whereby to every 
man there is more or less hope given, to incline and sway the 
assembly to their own ends. In a multitude of speakers therefore, 
where always, either one is eminent alone, or a few being equal 
amongst themselves, are eminent above the rest, that one or few 
must of necessity sway the whole; insomuch, that a democracy, 
in effect, is no more than an aristocracy of orators, interrupted 
sometimes with the temporary monarchy of one orator. (Hobbes, 
1640/2005c, 21.5, p. 141).
Practically, democracy is always a rule of one or few capable men 
who can persuade the whole democratic assembly of their own opinions 
and ambitions. In a democratic meeting, the orators and demagogues 
can easily gain power and actually rule over the whole democratic body 
politic like aristocrats and monarchs do. The difference is that unlike 
monarchs, demagogues do not have legal authority for their rule, since 
in democracy the authority is officially held by the democratic meeting.14 
Hobbes does not rely on the process of democratic deliberation by a 
long set of orations, but he seems to endorse the fact that every time 
14  In De Cive Hobbes states that “but in a Democracy the large numbers of Demagogues, i.e. 
orators who have influence with the people (and there are a lot of them and new ones come along 
every day) […]” (1642/2003, 10.6, p. 119 [269]). It seems that in a democracy, the problem of 





there is a possibility to persuade people by speech, the majority of 
them will follow those who possess good eloquence and “ornamentary 
style of speaking”.
It is also possible that the tyrannical demagogues or populists 
make the arbitrariness and cruelty of the leaders of democratic meetings 
much stronger than it is in monarchies. In De Cive Hobbes writes: “In 
a Monarchy therefore anyone who is prepared to live quietly is free of 
danger, whatever the character of the ruler” (1642/2003, 10.7, p. 120 
[270]). In democracies, the demagogues become Neros who will cruelly 
use people according to their own interests and join with other orators 
to oppress people. For this reason, in a democracy no one is safe from 
the cruelty of demagogues and orators. Two classical examples given by 
Hobbes clarify this question.
The first example is the case of Pericles in the Peloponnesian 
Wars, highlighting the relationship between the democratic demos 
and the democratic leader. Even though Pericles was a strong leader, 
he was still constantly oscillating between the people’s favour and 
despise. On the one hand, it seems that the advice Pericles gives to the 
people easily leads them to war. But in time of trouble, people start to 
hate their leader and give him a fine for leading Athens to war. Yet, 
soon after this, the people of Athens still elect Pericles as the leader 
of the Athenian troops. This shows how confused the Athenian people 
were, “as is the way with the multitude” as Thucydides states (Hobbes, 
1629/2005a, 20, p. 35).
The relationship between the Athenians and Pericles 
demonstrates those elements which Hobbes saw as dangerous in 
Athenian democracy. Even though Pericles was a good leader, a man of 
the State and a patriot, nothing like the demagogues such as Alcibiades, 
his rule was still very fragile. The picture Thucydides paints of Pericles 
is admirable, but he manages simultaneously to reveal that people did 
not in the end act as Pericles wanted. Right after the death of Pericles, 
people became confused and forgot everything they had learned from 
him. From this basis, Hobbes also sees that Thucydides was very critical 
towards democracy. In his Introduction to Thucydides’ Peloponnesian 
Wars, Hobbes notes that “For his [i.e. Thucydides] opinion touching 
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the democracy” (Hobbes, 1629/2005b, p. 16). This leads Hobbes to 
conclude that everything good in imperial Athens under the reign of 
Pericles was not derived from democracy, but monarchy: 
He [Thucydides] praiseth the government of Athens, when it was 
mixed of the few and the many: but more he commendeth it, both 
when Peisistratus reigned, (saving that it was an usurped power), 
and when in the beginning of this it was democratical in name, 
but in effect monarchical under Pericles. (1629/2005b, p. 17).
Another example is the case of Caesar, which further illustrates 
the problems of democracy and how in the Roman Empire it faced the 
constant danger of falling into the hands of charismatic populists. 
The case of Caesar shows how people can easily be drawn away from 
the obedience of the law and under the spell of a charismatic leader 
(Hobbes refers to demagogy as witchcraft) (Hobbes 1651/1999, 29.20, 
p. 220). Demagogues like Caesar flatter the people. They offer grain 
and wine, appoint popular civil servants and build temples that please 
people. Plutarch (tran. 2010)describes how Caesar gained popularity 
in Rome by spending the money gained in the Gallic wars to build up 
popular temples etc. Suetonius (tran. 1961,  pp. 7-8, 27) also describes 
vividly how Caesar gained power right from the beginning of his career 
by building temples, organizing gladiator shows etc. for the common 
people of Rome.
Also, the reputation of the leader might impact the people’s 
mind to not follow the laws and lawful leaders, but instead to join the 
rebellious action of the multitude. What is interesting in the example of 
Caesar is that Hobbes explicitly expresses how the danger of this kind 
of action happening in popular governments (that is, in democracy) 
is much bigger than it is in monarchy, because “an army is of so great 
force, and multitude, as it may easily be made believe, they are the 
people” (Hobbes, 1651/1999, 29.20, p. 220). Although Hobbes does 
not defend the republican model of power, he nevertheless notes that 
the reason for the ruin of the Senate in the rebellion that finally led 
Caesar to power was the unleashed power of the multitude. With the 
help of the raging multitude, Caesar subverted the power of the Senate. 





multitude with the help of his army (Hobbes, 1651/1999, 29.20, p. 
220). This example shows clearly how the line between the people 
and the multitude is continually oscillating. From this follows, that 
the fundamental problem for Hobbes is that the people, as a political 
subject, is in constant danger of becoming a multitude, that is, of 
turning into an apolitical monster.
Thus, according to Hobbes, the democratic meeting too much 
resembles the gathering of the multitude, where demagogues lead the 
ignorant but passionate people whose worst characters are publicly 
manifested. It is highly possible that Hobbes might have combined the 
ancient examples of democracy with the English experience of the Short 
and the Long parliaments. Hence, we should not take this picture of 
democracy as an accurate description of the British parliament in the 
se seventy century, but it shows instead the negativity and suspicion 
that Hobbes had of democratic government in general.
The Dangers of Passions and Corruption in Democracy
In The Elements of Law, Hobbes explains how passions15 form a great 
problem in assemblies such as democracy and aristocracy:16 “If the 
passions of many men be more violent when they are assembled 
together, then the inconvenience arising from passion will be greater 
in an aristocracy, than a monarchy” (1640/2005c, 5.4, p. 166).
When political questions are debated in large assemblies, 
everyone tries to push their own interests and ideas forward. This leads 
men to exaggerate their opinions and passions. The outcome is a sort of 
extremism where bad is made to seem even worse and good to appear 
even better. The most efficient way to do this is to give a speech to a large 
crowd of people and influence their passions with extreme examples and 
figures of speech. This instead leads to a situation where the extremism 
of some private men angers even the moderate people: “As a great 
many coals, though but warm asunder, being put together inflame one 
another”, states Hobbes (1640/2005c, 5.4, p. 167).
15  In this article I concentrate only to few examples concerning passions and democracy. 
For a short summary on this crucial theme in Hobbes’s political theory, please see Jakonen 
(2013, pp. 74-80).
16  In the Elements of Law Hobbes goes as far as to state that democracy and aristocracy are actually 
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According to Hobbes, monarchy is not as prone to passions as 
democracy and aristocracy are, since affections and passions have the 
strongest power in large social gatherings. This follows from the fact 
that “the mind of one man is not so variable in that point, as are the 
decrees of an assembly” (Hobbes, 1640/2005c, 5.4, p. 168). Orators 
are the “favourites of sovereign assemblies”. They can easily hurt the 
commonwealth with their eloquence, but they cannot heal what their 
words have brought about (Hobbes 1651/1999, 19.8, p. 126). The most 
dangerous thing according to Hobbes is the combination of passionate 
stupidity of the multitude and eloquence of the demagogues as Hobbes 
states when he compares demagogues to the story of Medea: 
Thus, stupidity and eloquence unite to subvert the commonwealth; 
in the manner in which once upon a time (as the story goes) the 
daughters of Pelias, king of Thessaly conspired with Medea against 
their father. Wishing to restore a decrepit old man to his youth, 
they cut him in pieces by the advice of Medea and placed him in 
the fire to cook, in the vain hope that he would be rejuvenated. 
In the same manner the mob (vulgus) in their stupidity, like the 
daughters of Pelias, desiring to renew their old commonwealth 
and led by the eloquence of ambitious men as by the sorcery of 
Medea, more often split it into factions and waste it with the fire 
than reform it. (Hobbes 1642/2003, 12.13, pp. 140-141).
Thus, the irrationality and easily provoked passions of the 
multitude puts the body politic in the tangible danger of falling apart. 
Democracy is always very close to multitude, and multitude is always 
subject to betrayal, and the more people there are together, the easier 
it is to hoax them all.17 This follows from the fact that in a multitude 
the variety of opinions, (in the end, everyone has their own), turns out 
paradoxically to be simple Manichean opinions when they are expressed 
by the multitude. This derives from the fact that the multitude acts 
according to its passions: It moves towards something that pleases it 
17  In Behemoth Hobbes says: “I have heard often that they ought to pay what was imposed by 
consent of Parliaments to the use of the King, but to their own use never before. I see by this, it 
is easier to gull the multitude, than any one man amongst them. For what one man, that has not 
his natural judgment depraved by accident, could be so easily cozened in a matter that concerns 
his purse, had he not been passionately carried away by the rest to change of government, or 





and moves away from everything that scares it. In multitude only brutal 
appetites and aversions have importance. It is of no use to ask anything 
special from the multitude, since the only answer it will give is simple 
pro or contra, if it can answer at all.18 Hence, if one (a demagogue for 
example) wants to lead a multitude, it must happen through easily 
understandable orders and by appealing to passions, not by rational 
discourse. For this reason, democracy seems to be in practice a very 
hazardous mode of government.
In The Elements of Law, Hobbes also gives an interesting insight 
into his understanding of the meaning of corruption. The alleged 
inconvenience of monarchy, or any kind of sovereign power as 
Hobbes specifies in De Cive (1642/2003, 10.5, p. 119 [268-269]), is 
that the monarch may legally take property from his subjects to fulfil 
the needs of the state. But sometimes he may also use the funds of the 
state to enrich his children, relatives, friends and others. This kind 
of corruption is, however, even more dangerous in an aristocracy and 
democracy, Hobbes claims. The more there are people taking part 
in the governance of the state, the more there are relatives, children 
and others, who also may demand their share of wealth and power. 
Aristocrats can also ally together as “twenty monarchs” and “set 
forward another’s designs mutually”. In democracy, there are always 
new people coming to seek the benefits of power and this easily leads 
to high costs of bribery and corruption that cannot be done without 
exploiting the citizens. In monarchy, corruption takes place within 
reasonable limits, argues Hobbes (1640/2005c, 5.5, p. 167, 1642/2003, 
10.6, pp. 119 [268-269]).
Thus, Hobbes sees that the public interest of the state is best 
watched over when the leader of the state is a monarch, who takes care 
of his own interests while considering the best for the state. In the 
Leviathan, Hobbes makes a very interesting argument, stating that:
18  In Leviathan Hobbes describes how the government of a multitude is incapable of action, as 
he compares it to the mute representative where the number of representatives is equal and 
thus, it is not possible to decide anything. “Or if the number be odd, as three, or more, men 
or assemblies; whereof every one has by a negative voice, authority to take away the effect 
of all the affirmative voices of the rest, this number is no representative; because by the 
diversity of opinions, and interests of men, it becomes oftentimes, and in cases of the greatest 
consequence, a mute person, and unapt, as for many things else, so for the government of a 
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where the public and private interest are most closely united, 
there is the public most advanced. Now in monarchy, the private 
interest is the same with the public. The riches, power, and 
honour of monarch arise only from the riches, strength and 
reputation of his subjects. For no king can be rich, nor glorious, 
nor secure; whose subjects are either poor, or contemptible, or 
too weak through want, or dissension, to maintain a war against 
their enemies; whereas in a democracy, or aristocracy, the public 
prosperity confers not so much to the private fortune of one that 
is corrupt, or ambitious, as doth many times a perfidious advice, a 
treacherous action, or a civil war. (1651/1999, 19.4, pp. 124-125).
Here Hobbes seems to be saying that democracy and aristocracy 
are prone to all sorts of confusion between private and public interests. 
Monarchy better suits the needs of a commonwealth that wants to live 
a secure and happy life. In other words, it is in the interests of the 
monarch to make his people happy and prosperous. The case is not so 
clear in aristocracy and democracy. 
Deliberation in Democracy
In De Cive, Hobbes states several times that democracy is a convention 
where decisions are made by the majority. Thus, as explained above, 
the act of voting is something that Hobbes relates strongly to the 
democratic practice of power (Hobbes, 1642/2003, 7.5 y 16, pp. 91-92, 
98-100 [235-236, 239, 244-247]). However, to practice voting there 
needs to be some kind of an institution where the voting takes place. 
Hobbes defines democracy by stating that:
From the fact that they have gathered voluntary, they are 
understood to be bound by the decisions made by agreement of 
the majority. And that is a Democracy, as long as the convention 
lasts, or is set to reconvene at certain times and places. For a 
convention whose will is the will of all the citizens has sovereign 
power. (Hobbes, 1642/2003, 7.5, p. 94 [239]).
To maintain the convention of democracy, that is the practice 
of voting and the expression of every particular citizen’s mind, there 





public deliberation and voting can take place. Without this, democracy 
will revert to the state of the multitude, claims Hobbes.19 Without a 
clearly set time and place for the next democratic meeting, there is 
no longer a demos, but instead a disorganized multitude, “to which no 
action or right may be attributed”. We see that demos, the people as the 
political subject, is in fact a practical democratic meeting that has an 
uninterrupted schedule (Hobbes, 1642/2003, 7.5, p. 94 [239]).
Along with this basic requirement, there has to be something else 
used to secure the preservation of sovereign power (people) between 
these meetings. It is impossible, says Hobbes, that a democratic 
meeting could sit uninterrupted. For this reason, the people as the 
sovereign have to relinquish the authority (potestas) of the people to 
one man or assembly of men for the interval between meetings. Again, 
democracy is in danger of turning into a corrupted aristocracy or 
monarchy, since it seems practically impossible to have a permanent 
and stable democratic meeting, which is capable of making decisions 
all the time (Hobbes, 1642/2003, 7.6, pp. 94-95 [239-240]).20
Hence, the last thing in the long list of disadvantages of the 
democratic government is the role of deliberation in the governance 
of the state. Deliberation is, of course, the most important thing in a 
democracy, since political decisions and the will of the state regarding 
every particular question is formed in the process of deliberation. In 
De Cive, Hobbes gives four reasons that prove why deliberation does not 
work properly in a democracy.
The first reason is that in democracy, deliberation is reduced 
under the public display of prudence and eloquence: “Each member 
[of a democratic meeting] has to make a long, continuous speech to 
express his opinion; and deploy his eloquence to make it as ornate 
19  Aristocracy resembles democracy in this sense. Hobbes writes: “Without a fixed schedule 
of the times and places at which the council of optimates may meet, there is no longer a council 
or a single person, but a disorganized multitude without sovereign power” (1642/2003, 
7.10, p. 96 [241-242]).
20  “But if a People is to retain sovereign power, it is not enough to have settled times and places 
for meeting. Either the intervals between the meetings must not be so long that something could 
happen in the meanwhile which (for lack of sovereign power) would endanger the commonwealth, 
or the people must devolve at least the exercise of sovereign power on some one man or one 
assembly for the intervening period. If this has not been done, no adequate provision has been 
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and attractive as possible to the audience, in order to win reputation” 
(Hobbes 1642/2003, 10.11, p. 123 [273-274]). Hence, deliberation, 
which should be the work of reason, becomes an interplay between 
rhetoric and passions where eloquence can persuade people to adopt 
whatever opinion.
In the Leviathan, Hobbes goes as far as to compare democracy to 
the infant king, who must take counsel and advice from several people. 
These custodes libertatis, as Hobbes ironically calls them, easily become 
nothing more than dictators and temporary monarchs. Hence, in 
democracy the counsel given by several people might lead to a situation 
where the actual power and sovereignty lies in the hands of counsellors, 
not in the hands of the people (Hobbes, 1651/1999, 19.9, p. 127).
The second reason why deliberation does not work in democracy 
is that decisions would mostly be made by dilettantes and novices. In 
military matters, for example, common people do not have enough 
knowledge about external powers and their resources (Hobbes, 
1642/2003, 10.11, p. 123 [273-274]). This means that, again, those who 
possess the skills of rhetoric are able to guide the ignorant multitude to 
accept whatever opinions and decisions on very serious matters.
The third reason is that democratic, public deliberation, where 
eloquence is used, leads too easily to the formation of different kinds 
of factions. Factions, Hobbes claims, “are the source of sedition and 
civil war” (1642/2003, 10.12, p. 123 [275]). The birth of factions follows 
from the fact that every orator tries to make other orators look bad, and 
for this reason they gather around them a group that is able to destroy 
their competitors. Hence, democracy is all about the competition of 
different factions, or parties in contemporary terminology.
This is also evident in meetings where different factions join 
together to receive the power through the majority of the votes. This 
leads to a politics where the sole aim is power and the wellbeing of 
the commonwealth is easily forgotten. When power is not reached 
through eloquence, people take up arms and the outcome is a civil war. 
Another possible outcome, albeit not quite as disastrous as a civil war 
but nevertheless a bad outcome of factions, is that the laws of the state 
are diminished under the arbitrary decisions of the leading factions. 





subject to constant change, comparing them to the waves of the sea. 
Constant, unpredictable change and uncontrolled motion is not good 
for the commonwealth (1642/2003, 10.12-13, pp. 123-124 [274-275], 
1651/1999, 19.6, p. 125). 21
The fourth and last reason why deliberation in democracy does 
not work is that secrets of the state are easily revealed to large audiences 
and, as a consequence, to the enemies as well. In this way the security 
and wellbeing of the state is endangered (Hobbes, 1642/2003, 10.12-13, 
pp. 123-124 [274-275]). In other words, public talk about the matters 
of the state is not suitable, since it tends to reveal the most important 
secrets of the state to the masses and via masses to enemies.
Conclusions
Even though the birth of the people is the birth of sovereign power and 
in this way democracy is the basis of any kind of absolute sovereign 
government, for Hobbes democracy is the worst kind of government 
for a commonwealth. In fact, democracy is incapable of taking care 
of the basic task that the sovereign needs to conduct. For Hobbes, the 
basic task of the sovereign is the security and wellbeing of the people 
(salus populi suprema lex) and the best government is that which can 
take care of the security in the best possible way, as Hobbes states in 
the Leviathan:
The difference between these three kinds of commonwealth, 
consisteth not in the difference of power; but in the difference 
of convenience, or aptitude to produce the peace, and security 
of the people; for which end they were instituted. (Hobbes, 
1651/1999, 19.4, p. 124).
In democracy, the power-relations between the sovereign 
and the subjects are as direct as possible, since every member of the 
commonwealth is also part of the sovereign assembly. For Hobbes, 
21  This view can be identified even from Hobbes’s earliest texts, Horae subsecivae. In his A 
Discourse Upon the Beginning of Tacitus Hobbes states: “After the people had delivered themselves 
from the authority of Kings, and came themselves to undergo the cares of government, they 
grew perplexed at every inconvenience, and shifted from one form of government to another, 
and so to another, and then to first again; like a man in a fever, that often turns to and fro in his 
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this flatness of power-relations is a real problem and a genuine threat 
to security: It is difficult to separate those who govern (people) from 
those who are governed (the multitude/population). People as citizens 
carry the artificial body politic of the people with their natural persons. 
For this reason, the democratic sovereign has much less power than 
the aristocratic or monarchic sovereign, since the power has been 
dispersed all over the body politic. Democracy as a mode of government 
does not fulfil the hopes Hobbes had put for the effectiveness of the 
governance in his geometric analysis of power.
For Hobbes, monarchy is a sort of an Archimedean point where 
the use of power over the multitude, or population in contemporary 
language, is the easiest. While in democracy, it is difficult to distinguish 
between those who govern and those who are governed, in a monarchy 
this difference is very clear. A monarch governs with the authority 
that the artificial body of the people has transferred wholly to the 
monarch. The same people are governed as the multitude, that is as 
the object of governance, by their own will. In contemporary language, 
the difference between the people and the population is of utmost 
importance for Hobbes. This usage of the concept of the multitude is 
significantly different compared with the classics: The multitude can 
never be a political subject for Hobbes and it must always be an object 
of governance. Political power must be able to take over and control the 
motion of the multitude.
As can be seen from the several pragmatic negative examples of 
democracy – concerning the problems of flat government, demagogy 
and populism, passions, corruption and difficulty of deliberation – 
given above, for Hobbes democracy is an un-pragmatic and problematic 
form of government, too closely linked to the multitude. It is in danger 
of dissolving into anarchy, to the state of nature, which is not a form 
of any commonwealth, but the lack of it. As Hobbes states: “anarchy 
(which signifies want of government” (Hobbes, 1651/1999, 19.2, p. 
123). Instead of an un-pragmatic and archaic democracy, Hobbes 
prefers the modern monarchy. A simple reason for monarchy is that it is 
a more practical form of power than democracy, because in a monarchy 
the capability of using power never ceases for a moment: “In the case 





place” (Hobbes, 1642/2003, 7.13, p. 97 [242]). In this way, monarchy 
in practice is a more omnipotent form of power than democracy, since 
in monarchy power is permanent and undivided, unlike in democracy.
Bibliographical References
Apperley, A. (1997). Hobbes on democracy. Politics, 19(3), 165-171. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9256.00101
Aristotle. (1995). Politics. In J. Barnes (Ed.), The complete works of 
Aristotle. The revised Oxford translation (Vol. 2, pp. 1986-2129). 
Princeton, United States of America: Princeton University.
Biller, P. (2000). The measure of multitude: Population in medieval 
thought. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University.
Creppell, I. (2009). The democratic element in Hobbes’s “Behemoth”. In 
T. Mastnak (Ed.), Hobbes’s Behemoth. Religion and democracy (pp. 
241-268). Exeter, United Kingdom: Exeter Imprint Academic.
Curran, E. (2007). Reclaiming the rights of the hobbesian subject. 
London, United Kingdom: Palgrave Macmillan. https://doi.
org/10.1057/9780230592742
Dyzenhaus, D. (2001). Hobbes and the legitimacy of law. Law and 
Philosophy, 20(5), 461-498. https://doi.org/10.2307/3505220
Evans, C. S. (2000). “An echo of the multitude”: The intersection of 
governmental and private property initiatives in early modern 
Exeter. Albion: A Quarterly Journal Concerned with British Studies, 
32 (3), 408-428. https://doi.org/10.2307/4053912
Hill, C. (1975). The world turned upside down. Radical ideas during the 
English Revolution. London, United Kingdom: Penguin. 
Hobbes, T. (1990). Behemoth or the Long Parliament. Chicago, United 
States of America: Chicago University. (Original work published 
1681). Cited by page of current edition followed with the page of 
W. Molesworth edition in English works of Thomas Hobbes (Vol. 6, 
pp. 161-418). London, United Kingdom: Bohn.
Hobbes, T. (1995). Three discourses. A critical modern edition of newly 
identified work of the young Hobbes. Chicago, United States of 




Needed but Unwanted. Thomas Hobbes’s Warnings on the 
Dangers of Multitude, Populism and Democracy 
Hobbes, T. (1999). Leviathan. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford 
University. (Original work published 1651). Cited by chapter, 
paragraph and page.
Hobbes, T. (2003). On the citizen (R. Tuck & M. Silverthorne, Trans.). 
Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University. (Original 
work published 1642). Cited by chapter, paragraph and page 
followed with the page of latin edition of W. Molesworth, in Opera 
philosophica (Vol. 2, pp. 133-432). London, United Kingdom: 
British Library.
Hobbes, T. (2005a). Eight books of the Peloponnesian war written 
by Thucydides, the son of Olorus, interpreted with faith and 
diligence immediately out of the greek by Thomas Hobbes. 
Secretary to the late Earl of Devonshire. In W. Molesworth 
(Ed.), English works (Vol. 8 y 9). Elibron Classics. (Original work 
published 1629).
Hobbes, T. (2005b). Of the life and history of Thucydides. In W. 
Molesworth (Ed.), English works (Vol. 8, pp. 13-32). Elibron 
Classics. (Original work published 1629).
Hobbes, T. (2005c). The elements of law (Human nature and De corpore 
politico). In W. Molesworth (Ed.), English works (Vol. 4, pp. 
1-278). Elibron Classics. (Original Work published 1640). Cited 
by chapter, paragraph and page.
Hoekstra, K. (2007). A lion in the house: Hobbes and democracy. In A. 
Brett & J. Tully (Eds.), Rethinking the foundations of modern political 
thought. Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University.
Jakonen, M. (2013). Multitude in motion. Re-readings on the political 
philosophy of Thomas Hobbes. Jyväskylä, Finland: University of 
Jyväskylä.
Jaume, L. (1986). Hobbes et l’État représentatif moderne [Hobbes and the 
modern representative State]. Paris, France: PUF.
Lemos, RM. (1978). Hobbes and Locke. Power and consent. Athens, 
Greece: University of Georgia.
Martel, J. R. (2007). Subverting the Leviathan. Reading Thomas Hobbes 






Martinich, A. P. (2007). Hobbes, a biography. Cambridge, United 
Kingdom: Cambridge University.
Matheron, A. (1997). The theoretical function of democracy in 
Spinoza and Hobbes. In Montag & Stolze (Eds.), The new 
Spinoza (pp. 207-218). Minneapolis, United States of America: 
Minnesota University.
Mastnak, T. (2009). Godly Democracy. In T. Matsnak (Ed.), Hobbes’s 
Behemoth. Religion and democracy (pp. 210-240). Exeter, 
Finland: Imprint Academic.
Patrides, C. A. (1965). The beast with many heads: Renaissance Views 
on the Multitude. Shakespeare Quarterly, 16(2), 241-246. https://
doi.org/10.2307/2868280
Pettit, P. (2008). Made with words. Princeton, United States of America: 
Princeton University Press.
Plutarch. (2010). Lives I (J. Langhorne & W. Langhorne, Trans.). South 
Carolina, United States of America: Nabu Press.
Rahe, P. A. (2008). Against throne and altar. Machiavelli and political theory 
under the english republic. Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge 
University. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511509650
Schmitt, C. (2002). Le Léviathan dans la doctrine de l’État de Thomas 
Hobbes [The Leviathan in the state theory of Thomas Hobbes] 
(D. Trierweiler, Tran.). Paris, France: de Seuil. 
Silverthorne, M & Tuck, R. (2003). Introduction. In T. Hobbes, On the citizen 
(pp. viii-lii). Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University.
Suetonius. (1961). Vie des douze Césars [Life of the twelve Caesars] (H. 
Ailloud, Tran.). Paris, France: Société d’édition ”Les Belles Lettres”.
Tralau, J. (2007). Leviathan, the beast of myth. In P. Springborg (Ed.), 
The Cambridge companion to Hobbes’s Leviathan (pp. 61-81). 
Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University. https://
doi.org/10.1017/CCOL0521836670.003 
Tuck, R. (2007). Hobbes and democracy. In A. Brett & J. Tully (Eds.), 
Rethinking the Foundations of Modern Political Thought (pp. 171-
190). Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University.
